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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner-Appellant Paul Ezra Rhoades ("Rhoades") appeals from the district 
court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Summary Dismissal dismissing 
his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief because it is untimely and he failed to establish 
equitable tolling. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
In 1987, an Information was filed charging Rhoades with Nolan J. Haddon's first-
degree murder and the robbery at Buck's Store where Nolan was working when he was 
murdered by Rhoades. (R., p.99A, Brief in Support of Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal ("Brief in Support"), Appendix A.) 1n the same Information, but 
unrelated case, Rhoades was also charged with numerous offenses committed against 
Susan Michelbacher, including first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, robbery, 
rape and infamous crime against nature. (R., p.99A, Brief in Support, Appendix A.) 
On July 2, 1987, the state filed a Supplemental Response to Defendant's 
Discovery Request, disclosing a report by Don Wycoff "relative to materials heretofore 
examined by him," which was to be provided to Rhoades by July 13, 1987. (R., p.99A, 
Brief in Support, Appendix C, p. 1.) The supplemental response also referenced a report 
and additional witnesses that would be "forthcoming upon [the state's] receipt of the test 
results from a FBI Seriologist [sic]," which had been submitted on June 2, 1987, and 
involved the "submission of a semen sample ... done after consulting defendant's 
attorney Stephen Hart." (R., p.99A, Brief in Support, Appendix C, p.l.) Rhoades has 
1 
never contended he did not receive the subsequent FBI report and actually appears to 
concede it was received prior to the Michelbacher trial. (R., pp.30-3 l, 72.) 
After Rhoades pled not guilty, he filed a Motion to Sever Charges requesting, "all 
matters alleged to have occurred relative to Susan Michelbacher be separated and severed 
from those alleged to have been relative to Nolan Haddon" (R., p.99A, Brief in Support, 
Appendix B), which the trial court granted (R., p.99A, Brief in Support, Appendix D, 
pp.23-27). 1 
During the Michelbacher trial, Wycoff testified regarding the conclusions of the 
state laboratory reports regarding PGM blood testing, which included testimony that 
Rhoades could not be excluded as a semen donor. (R., p.99A, Transcript Excerpts from 
Bonneville County Case No. 87-04-547 ("Transcript Excerpts"), Appendix 2, p.1689.) 
The transcript excerpt, which was offered by Rhoades in the instant case, makes no 
reference to the FBI analysis or report. (R., p.99A, Transcript Excerpts, Appendix 2.) 
After Rhoades was convicted in the Michelbacher case and another case from 
Bingham County involving the first-degree murder of Stacy Baldwin (R., p.99A, Brief in 
Support, Appendix I, p.1), the parties entered into a written plea agreement, allowing 
Rhoades to enter an "Alford"2 plea to second-degree murder and robbery in connection 
with Nolan's murder and the robbery at Buck's Convenience Store. (R., p.99A, Brief in 
Support, Appendix E.) Rhoades maintained his innocence, but conceded the strength of 
the state's evidence and that "a conviction may be had on the charges as presently filed 
including the charge of First Degree murder." (R., p.99A, Brief in Support, Appendix E, 
1 The same attorneys represented Rhoades in both the Michelbacher and Haddon cases. 
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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p.2.) The agreement also reserved Rhoades' right to appeal, pursuant to !.C.R. 11, "any 
and all motions filed prior to the date of this Agreement." (R., p.99A, Brief in Support, 
Appendix E, pp.7-9.) Finally, the agreement detailed the state's evidence that would be 
presented at trial, none of which involved serology testing by an Idaho State crime lab or 
the FBI. (R., p.99A, Brief in Support, Appendix E, pp.2-5.) 
Pursuant to the plea agreement, an amended information was filed (R., p.99A, 
Brief in Support, Appendix F) and Rhoades was subsequently sentenced to indeterminate 
life for second-degree murder and indeterminate life for robbery, to be served 
concurrently (R., p.99A, Brief in Support, Appendix G). The Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed Rhoades' convictions and sentences. State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594,809 P.2d 
455 (1991). The Remittitur issued March 8, 1991. (R., p.99A, Brief in Support, 
Appendix H.) 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of the Underlying Post-Conviction Proceedings 
In 1997, Rhoades filed a federal writ of habeas corpus, which the federal district 
court dismissed on March 30, 2006. (R., p.99A, Brief in Support, Appendix I, p.1.) On 
July 29, 2005, while his federal habeas case was pending and more than fourteen years 
after the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, Rhoades filed the 
instant Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, raising the following claims: (1) the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to advise counsel that the FBI' s PGM test 
allegedly exonerated Rhoades of the rape in the Michelbacher case and failing to correct 
Wycoffs allegedly false trial testimony regarding PGM testing in that case (R., pp.6-12); 
(2) actual innocence of the crimes for which he pied guilty (R., p.12); (3) ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel by failing to provide Rhoades' forensic expert in the 
3 
Michelbacher case with "sufficient and available information regarding the PGM testing 
conducted by the FBI on the swabs collected from the victim and the samples conducted 
from Petitioner and others to allow that expert to discern that the FBI PGM report 
exonerated Petitioner" (R., pp.12-13); and (4) a request for DNA testing "of any and all 
evidence which may contain Deoxyribonucleic acid ('DNA') collected by the State in the 
investigation of the murder of Nolan Haddon" (R., pp.14-16). The basis of Rhoades' 
claims are premised upon an affidavit from Greg Hampikian, Ph.D., who contends the 
FBI report, on its face, excludes Rhoades as the semen contributor in the Michelbacher 
case. (R., pp.33-36.) 
The state responded by filing an answer (R., pp.37-44) and Motion for Summary 
Dismissal Based Upon Statute of Limitations, asserting Rhoades' petition required 
dismissal because it was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitation in the Uniform 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA") under LC. § 19-4902(a). Rhoades 
subsequently informed the district court he was withdrawing his fourth claim regarding 
DNA testing, but desired to proceed on his three remaining claims. (R., p.56.) Rhoades 
responded to the state's motion by conceding his post-conviction petition is untimely, but 
asserting he was entitled to equitable tolling because the prosecutor allegedly elicited 
false testimony from Wycoff during the Michelbacher trial and subsequently failed to 
disclose he had elicited false testimony. (R., pp.68-77.) After hearing oral argument 
(Tr., pp.7-21), on November 27, 2007, the district court granted the state's motion to 
dismiss, concluding Rhoades' petition was untimely and that he failed to meet his burden 
of establishing equitable tolling (R., pp.85-92). Rhoades' timely Notice of Appeal was 
filed January 8, 2008. (R., pp.93-98.) 
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ISSUES 
Rhoades has stated the issues on appeal as follows: 
(1) Whether the district court abused is discretion in summarily 
dismissing the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief for untimely 
filing even though Appellant had no notice of the prosecutorial 
misconduct claims ("First Ground") or the scientific basis for his 
actual innocence claims ("Second Ground"), his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim ("Third Ground"), or his claim to test 
the biological evidence for DNA ("Fourth Ground") until he 
consulted an expert out of an abundance of caution, and even 
though neither trial defendants nor postconviction petitioners have 
any obligation to search for evidence of prosecutorial misdeeds, 
absent notice of their existence; 
(2) Whether the district court abused its discretion by applying the 
wrong legal standard to determine whether Appellant was entitled 
to equitable tolling and, alternatively, whether in any event 
Appellant met the standard which the district court erroneously 
employed. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Because Rhoades has failed to establish the district court applied an incorrect 
equitable tolling standard or that the district court's factual findings regarding 
prosecutorial misconduct are clearly erroneous, has Rhoades failed to establish 
the district court erred by dismissing his untimely post-conviction petition? 
2. Because Rhoades' appeal is being brought frivolously and without foundation, 




Because Rhoades Failed To Establish The State Prevented Him From Filing A Timely 
Post-Conviction Petition, The District Court Properly Dismissed His Petition 
A. Introduction 
Rhoades concedes his post-conviction petition was not filed within the one-year 
UPCP A statute of limitation, but contends he is entitled to equitable tolling. Specifically, 
he contends the district court "abused its discretion" by applying an incorrect legal 
equitable tolling standard by applying the "high federal legal standard which Idaho has 
never adopted" - "extraordinary circumstance." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Rhoades also 
contends even if the district court applied the correct legal standard, he met that standard 
because the state allegedly concealed exculpatory evidence by not disclosing Wycoffs 
testimony was allegedly false. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-19.) Finally, Rhoades contends 
the district court "abused its discretion" by concluding he presented no evidence that the 
prosecutor knew of an alternative interpretation of the FBI' s report and deliberately 
withheld such evidence from Rhoades, and deliberately withheld evidence that Wycoffs 
testimony at the Michelbacher trial was perjured. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-17.) 
The state concurs that Rhoades' petition was not timely filed within the UPCPA's 
one-year statute of limitation. Further, the district court applied the correct legal standard 
for equitable tolling as previously adopted by the Idaho Court of Appeals and, more 
importantly, Rhoades failed to meet any standard for equitable tolling because he failed 
to present any evidence establishing the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence or 
suborned perjury in the Michelbacher trial. Finally, Rhoades has failed to establish the 
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court's factual findings, regarding his contention of prosecutorial misconduct, are clearly 
erroneous or that the court misapplied the law to those facts. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The applicability of a statute of limitation to an action under a given set of facts is 
a question of law subject to free review on appeal. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 
796 P.2d 121 (1990); Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, ---, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 
2008); Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 628, 836 P.2d 1088 (Ct. App. 1992). An 
appellate court will defer to the factual findings made by the district court unless they are 
clearly erroneous, requiring Rhoades to establish the court's factual findings are "not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record." Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 82 P.3d 787 (2002); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 256, 869 P.2d 571 
(Ct. App. 1994). However, this Court exercises free review over the application of the 
relevant law to those facts. Gabourie, 125 Idaho at 256. 
C. Rhoades' Post-Conviction Petition Was Properly Dismissed Because It Was 
Untimely And He Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing Equitable Tolling 
1. Introduction 
Because Rhoades' instant case involves a non-capital sentence, it is governed by 
the UPCPA, codified at LC. § 19-4901, et. seq. Rhoades' first three claims all stem from 
his guilty plea and conviction for second-degree murder and robbery and, therefore, must 
have been filed within the time constraints ofl.C. § 19-4902(a).3 
3 Rhoades' fourth claim involved DNA testing on evidence secured as a result of the 
investigation regarding Nolan's murder and the robbery at Buck's Store. Therefore, this 
claim was governed by the time constraints of LC. § 19-4902(b). Because Rhoades 
withdrew his fourth claim (R., p.56), it is urmecessary to further address it. However, 
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2. Rhoades' First Three Claims Were Not Filed Within One Year From The 
Determination Of His Appeal 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) establishes the statute of limitation for filing a post-
conviction petition, as follows, "An application may be filed at any time within one (1) 
year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or 
from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." "The 
'appeal' referenced in that section means the appeal in the underlying criminal case." 
Gonzales v. State, 139 Idaho 384, 385, 79 P.3d 743 (Ct. App. 2003). "[T]he limitation 
period begins to run, after an unsuccessful appeal, when the Idaho Supreme Court or the 
Idaho Court of Appeals issues a remittitur." Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205, 207, 984 
P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1999). The failure to file a timely petition is a basis for dismissal of 
the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001). 
The Remittitur in Rhoades' case was issued March 8, 1991. (R., p.99A, Brief in 
Support, Appendix H.) However, Rhoades did not file hls instant petition until July 29, 
2005, more than fourteen years after issuance of the Remittitur. (R., p.3.) Because 
Rhoades' petition was not timely filed, the district court properly dismissed it unless he 
demonstrated equitable tolling sufficient to toll the one-year statute oflimitation. 
3. Rhoades Has Failed To Establish The District Court Applied An Incorrect 
Equitable Tolling Standard 
The district court properly recognized Idaho has adopted the doctrine of equitable 
tolling in post-conviction cases. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d 776 (Ct. 
App. 2003). Addressing the law regarding equitable tolling, the district court explained: 
even if Rhoades had not withdrawn hls fourth claim, it was untimely and would be 
governed by the same standards of equitable tolling as detailed in this brief. 
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"[T]he bar for equitable tolling for post-conviction actions is high." 
Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. 
App. 2005). In federal habeas actions, [for] a petitioner to be entitled to 
equitable tolling, he must show "'(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' 
and prevented timely filing." Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085 
(2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)[)] 
(petitioner bears the burden of showing entitlement to equitable tolling). 
Petitioner has failed to meet the burden of showing the existence of some 
extraordinary circumstance which stood in the way of his timely filing the 
instant petition. 
(R., pp.89-90.) 
Rhoades contends the district court's use of the federal standard requiring "some 
extraordinary circumstance" constitutes an "abuse of discretion." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.12, 17.) First, determination of the proper legal standard to be applied is a question of 
law over which this Court exercises free review, not an "abuse of discretion." State v. 
LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 807, 69 P.3d 1064 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Second, Rhoades' contention that the district court applied an erroneous legal 
standard is simply incorrect. While Idaho has recognized the doctrine of equitable tolling 
in post-conviction cases, it has generally been limited to include: "(1) where the 
petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility or an in-state conviction without 
legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials; (2) and where mental disease 
and/or psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner 
from earlier pursuing challenges to his convictions." Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 
88 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2003). The court of appeals has also determined "there may be 
circumstances in which a language barrier would legitimately give rise to an access to 
court claim for purposes of extending the filing deadline." Id. Finally, in Chico-
Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137 (Ct. App. 2005), the court of 
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appeals expressly discussed and implicitly adopted the federal courts' requirement of "an 
'extraordinary circumstances' or 'rare and exceptional circumstances' standard for 
determining when the statute of limitation for a post-conviction or habeas corpus action is 
equitably tolled," and that "[t]hese cases illustrate that the bar for equitable tolling for 
post-conviction actions is hlgh." Further, a petitioner seeking equitable tolling must 
demonstrate a causal connection between the "extraordinary circumstance" and failure to 
timely file a petition. Id. Based upon Chlco-Rodriguez, Rhoades has failed to establish 
the district court applied an incorrect standard. 
Finally, when the district court's opinion is read in context, it is readily apparent it 
was not based upon a finding that Rhoades failed to establish an "extraordinary 
circumstance," but a finding that he failed to establish any factual basis warranting 
equitable tolling. The court concluded if Rhoades could establish the prosecutor knew 
Rhoades was exonerated based upon the FBI report, withheld that information from 
Rhoades, and suborned perjury when Wycoff testified in the Michelbacher trial, "[t]here 
[ would] be no doubt but that deliberate deception in a criminal prosecution would likely 
entitle a petitioner to equitable tolling for LC. § 19-4902 purposes." (R., p.90.) 
However, addressing Rhoades' factual contention regarding the withholding of 
exculpatory evidence and subordination of perjury, the court concluded: 
However, the Court cannot accept Petitioner's illogical and grandiose 
inference drawn from one expert's opinion. 
Petitioner has failed to present an iota of evidenc.e that the 
prosecution knew of an alternative interpretation of the FBI' s PGM report 
at the time of trial and deliberately withheld that information from 
Petitioner. Petitioner has failed to present even a scintilla of evidence of 
[sic] that the serological expert's testimony was perjured, let alone at the 
elicitation of the prosecution. Simply put, Petitioner has not presented any 
evidence to the Court of wrongdoing on the part of the prosecution. In 
10 
fact, Petitioner has not even alleged that he, himself, was not in possession 
of the PGM report during trial. To quote the Court's opinion rendered in 
CV-02-3822, "Petitioner does not assert that the FBI report was withheld 
from him and his defense counsel before his trial in 1987. Rather, 
Petitioner only contends that in 2005 he obtained an expert to review the 
FBI report." (Brief in Supp. Resp. Mot. For Summ. Dis., at l !.) 
The assertion that the expert for a criminal prosecution in 1988 
incorrectly interpreted the results of a DNA test does not support the 
inference that the prosecution must have engaged in malicious or 
deliberate deception. In 1988, DNA testing was still a nascent and 
developing procedure, which is why the Idaho legislature allowed 
reexamination of tests which led to conviction up and until July 1, 2002. 
However, despite this extended deadline, Petitioner failed to petition for 
reexamination of the PGM report despite the ample time since his 
conviction and the many advances which have been made in the field of 
DNA testing. In the absence of anything but bare allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct, the Court does not find Petitioner entitled to 
equitable tolling of the applicable statutes. The purpose of equitable 
tolling is to afford relief to a party genuinely aggrieved by malicious 
prosecution and extraordinary limitations in that party's ability to pursue 
constitutionally-protected rights; the purpose is not to give a genuinely 
guilty party extraordinary time to cherry-pick experts and formulate 
potentially-successful defensive theories. 
(R., pp.90-91.) 
The district court's discussion and rejection of Rhoades' contention - that he was 
entitled to equitable tolling based upon the alleged withholding of exculpatory evidence 
and subordination of perjury by the prosecutor - clearly establishes the court's decision 
was not based upon an erroneous legal standard, but his complete failure to present 
sufficient facts to support his equitable tolling theory. 
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4. Rhoades Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Findings Of Fact 
Are Clearly Erroneous 
Assuming arguendo the withholding of exculpatory evidence and subordination of 
perjury would establish a basis for equitable tolling,4 Rhoades has failed to establish the 
district court's findings of fact regarding his claim, which resulted in the decision that he 
failed to establish a factual basis supporting such prosecutorial misconduct, are clearly 
erroneous or that the court erred in its application of the law to those facts. 
The entirety of Rhoades' argument is premised upon the July 13, 1987 FBI 
serology report (R., p.30), Dr. Hampikian's two affidavits, the first signed on June 20, 
2005 (R., pp.33-36), and the second on December 21, 2006 (R., pp.83-84), and transcript 
excerpts from the Michelbacher trial which include four pages ofWycoffs testimony and 
three pages of the prosecutor's closing argument (R., p.99A, Transcript Excerpts From 
Bonneville County Case No. 87-04-547).5 However, not only do these documents, 
4 It must be noted that Rhoades has failed to cite a single case from any court establishing 
the withholding of exculpatory evidence and the subornation of perjury constitutes a basis 
for equitable tolling. The state is unaware of any court providing equitable tolling based 
upon the subornation of perjury. 
5 Rhoades also quotes from another sworn statement from Dr. Hampikian, which he 
contends comes from "the related Bonneville County capital case postconviction 
proceedings regarding DNA testing and now before this Court in review as Case No. 
34236." (Appellant's brief, p.4 n.6.) However, because this additional statement is not 
part of the record in this case, this Court must disregard it. Feld v. Idaho Crop 
Improvement Assoc., 126 Idaho 1014, 1016, 895 P.2d 1207 (1995); Schneider v. Curry, 
106 Idaho 264, 267, 678 P.2d 56, 59 (Ct. App. 1984). Likewise, Rhoades' reference to 
the state's ballistic expert's opinion (Appellant's brief, p.1), the portion of the 
Michelbacher trial transcript referenced on page 5, footnote 7 of Rhoades' brief, and that 
portion of Wycoffs testimony quoted on pages 5 and 6 of Rhoades' brief are not part of 
the record in this case and cannot be considered by this Court. Moreover, omitted or 
missing parts of the record are presumed to support the action of the district court. State 
v. Tucker, 131 Idaho 174, 177, 953 P.2d 614 (1998); State v. Acevedo, 131 Idaho 513, 
515 n.3, 960 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1998); LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 118-19, 937 P.2d 
427 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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individually or collectively, fail to establish the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence 
or suborned perjury in this case, they also fail to establish the prosecutor withheld 
exculpatory evidence or suborned perjury in the Michelbacher case. 
As detailed above, Rhoades has never contended the state failed to provide him a 
copy of the FBI report prior to the Michelbacher trial, which forms the basis of Dr. 
Hampikian's conclusion, only that he recently retained Dr. Hampikian who has rendered 
an opinion different from that of the state's expert, Donald Wyckoff. The first indication 
the FBI was testing forensic evidence was on July 2, 1987, in the state's supplemental 
discovery response, which stated, "A report and additional witnesses will be forthcoming 
upon our receipt of the test results from a FBI Seriologist [sic]. These materials were 
submitted on June 2, 1987 and we expect them shortly. This submission to the FBI of a 
semen sample was done after consulting defendant's attorney Stephen Hart." (R., p.99A, 
Brief in Support, Appendix C, p.1.) Based upon the discussion with Rhoades' attorney 
regarding the submission of the semen sample to the FBI and the disclosure of the FBI 
report, Rhoades has simply failed to establish the state withheld exculpatory evidence. 
Rhoades nevertheless contends, based upon the report, "it is beyond dispute that 
the FBI crime laboratory and a state crime laboratory analyst were aware of the report's 
meaning" and "[t]he prosecuting attorneys should likewise have known the report's 
meaning." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) However, if the prosecuting attorneys should have 
known of the report's meaning, Rhoades' attorney should also have known of its 
meaning. Moreover, not only is there no evidence establishing Wycoff was ever given a 
copy of the FBI report, there is no evidence establishing he could not have reviewed the 
report and simply arrived at a different conclusion or not recognized the meaning of the 
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report as alleged by Dr. Hampikian. In fact, based upon the allegations contained in 
Rhoades' post-conviction petition, it appears he was provided a serology expert prior to 
the Michelbacher trial and that the report was actually provided to that expert. (R., p.13.) 
Therefore, either Rhoades was aware of the allegedly alternative conclusion from the FBI 
report or his expert agreed with Wycoff, ifhe was actually provided a copy of the report, 
that it failed to alter the conclusion that Rhoades could not be excluded as a semen donor 
in the Michelbacher case. As noted by the Fourth Circuit: 
[I]t will nearly always be possible in cases involving basic human 
emotions to find one expert witness who disagrees with another, and to 
procure an affidavit to that effect from the second prospective witness .... 
There is no doubt fifteen years later looking through a "retroscope" that 
some attorney or psychiatrist may do better, but that is not the question. 
Counsel identified problems, conducted examinations, and presented 
evidence. No more is required. 
Waye v. Murray, 884 F.2d 765, 767 (4th Cir. 1989). 
Rhoades' reliance upon Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000), and 
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004), is misplaced (Appellant's brief, pp.12-13, 17-19), 
because neither involve the question of whether Rhoades can meet the high hurdle of 
establishing equitable tolling. While the state may have had a duty to provide Rhoades 
with exculpatory evidence, that alleged failure did not "actually prevent[] him from filing 
a post-conviction action." Chico-Rodriguez, 141 Idaho at 582. Dr. Hampikian's 
affidavits are based only upon the FBI report, which was provided to Rhoades and his 
expert prior to the Michelbacher trial, thereby providing him the opportunity to establish 
whether the FBI's testing allegedly exonerated him. Rhoades' attorney merely had to 
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read the report or submit it to their expert; the state did not prevent Rhoades from filing 
his petition. 6 
Rhoades has simply failed to establish the district court's findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous or that the court erred in its application of the law to those facts because 
the report was in his possession and, if it was not provided to his expert in the 
Michelbacher case, clearly could have been provided. 
II. 
Because Rhoades' Appeal Is Frivolous, The Court Should Award the State Costs and 
Attorney Fees on Appeal 
"An action for post-conviction relief is civil in nature and is governed by the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, ---, 190 P.3d 920,922 
(Ct. App. 2008). Pursuant to I.A.R. 40, "costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to 
the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." Idaho's 
appellate courts have awarded costs to the prevailing party in post-conviction appeals. 
See Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 392, 913 P.2d 1160 (1996) (costs to respondent); 
Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 796, 702 P.2d 826 (1985) (costs to appellant). 
An award of attorney fees should be made to the state pursuant to Idaho Code § 
12-121 and I.A.R. 41. "An award of attorneys fees under LC. § 12-121 is proper only 
where the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Chavez v. Barrus, 2008 WL 
6 Rhoades' petition expressly states he had the same attorneys in both the Michelbacher 
and Nolan cases. (R., pp.12-13.) The petition further avers they had retained an expert 
witness in the Michelbacher case, but failed to provide that expert with information that 
allegedly would have permitted the expert to discern the FBI report exonerated Rhoades. 
(R., p.13.) Therefore, it is clear Rhoades had an expert that could have reviewed the FBI 
report and determined if it exonerated Rhoades of the Michelbacher rape. 
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3905436, *12 (Idaho 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Even a cursory 
review of Rhoades' brief establishes this appeal presents such a circumstance. Not only 
has Rhoades failed to provide any cogent argument establishing the district court applied 
an incorrect equitable tolling standard, he failed to recognize the court's decision was 
based upon his complete failure to present any evidence establishing the factual basis of 
his equitable tolling argument. Rhoades has cited incorrect standards of review and 
included references and quotations to documents and pleadings that are not part of the 
record, despite the state's warning before the district court that the factual basis of parts 
of his argument were not part of the record, specifically his contention the FBI report was 
discussed by Wycoff at the Michelbacher trial. (Tr., pp.19-20.) 
While the Idaho Supreme Court has previously concluded requests for attorney 
fees and costs in capital post-conviction cases are inappropriate, State v. Creech, 132 
Idaho 1, 23, 966 P.2d 1 (1998), this is an appeal from Rhoades' non-capital post-
conviction case. Therefore, because of the frivolous arguments advanced by Rhoades 
and the time and resources the Office of the Attorney General has devoted to responding 
to his frivolous appeal, the state requests it be awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district comt' s summary 
dismissal of Rhoades' untimely post-conviction petition, and award the state costs and 
attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2008. 
Deputy Attorney, era! 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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Dennis Benjamin 
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